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The purpose of this study is to outline and analyze the acquisition and sustainment 
process for the current U.S. Marine Corps’ RQ-11B Raven Digital Data Link small 
unmanned aerial system program. The current sustainment of the Marine Corps’ Raven 
evolved from the support employed for its predecessor analog variant in 2008, which was 
originally supported by Marine organic assets below depot-level maintenance 
requirements. The Raven’s manufacturer, AeroVironment, Inc., now stations a field 
service representative in theater and has been under a contractor logistics support contract 
since around June 2011 after the Marine Corps struggled to implement organic support 
and sustain its Ravens at the organizational and intermediate levels. 
  
This report serves as a case study for insights into the acquisition strategies for 
future unmanned systems.  I explore the advantages and limitations of organic versus 
contractor support options in the form of monetary, organizational, and logistical 
resource allocation by analyzing the spectrum of solutions throughout the supply and 
maintenance constructs.  The analysis covers both operational and sustainment 
perspectives through the lens of doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and 
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The RQ-11B Raven with digital data link (DDL) is the U.S. Marine Corps’ 
(USMC) latest program of record (PoR) providing an intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) unmanned aircraft system (UAS) solution for the lowest command 
echelon of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). It is procured through the 
Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) in concert with (and under a prime contract 
via) the U.S. Army’s program manager for UASs (PM-UAS).  Intended as a battalion-
level asset, the Raven B (an analog variant) has been employed by the Marines during 
combat operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan since 2008.  It replaced the RQ-14A 
Dragon Eye UAS, the Corps’ first hand-launched reconnaissance mini-UAV.  The Raven 
has a history of being hugely successful on the battlefield by providing real-time aerial 
intelligence for Marines and soldiers on the front lines.  
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this study is to outline and analyze the acquisition and sustainment 
process for the current Marine Corps’ RQ-11B Raven small unmanned aerial system 
(SUAS) program.  It serves as a case study for insights into the acquisition strategies for 
future unmanned systems.  Additionally, in this business case analysis (BCA), I identify 
potential costs and benefits of an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) contractor 
logistics support (CLS) contract for the Raven’s supply and maintenance services.  I 
explore the advantages and limitations of this option in the form of monetary, 
organizational, and logistical resource allocation by analyzing the spectrum of solutions 
the Marine Corps and NAVAIR used within the OEM-CLS blended sustainment model.  
The main objectives of this thesis are to accomplish the following: 
 document the Marine Corps Raven SUAS sustainment process and 
organization;  
 research and record lessons learned;  









 determine what benefits the Marine Corps realized through the current 
OEM-CLS contract; and 
 develop heuristics and/or criteria to help improve Marine Corps UAS 
acquisition and sustainment processes.   
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The Raven B DDL is currently being fielded to Marines in Afghanistan and 
supported through a modified OEM logistics contract for parts and maintenance.  The 
current sustainment of the Marine Corps’ Raven DDL evolved from the support 
employed for its predecessor variants, which were originally supported by Marine 
organic assets below depot-level maintenance requirements.  According to a logistics 
analyst at the NAVAIR, an AeroVironment, Inc., (AV) field service representative (FSR) 
is now stationed in theater and has been since around June 2011 in order to provide the 
most responsive support possible.  This representative is available in addition to AV’s 
continental U.S. (CONUS) locations. The decision to contract logistics support came 
after the NAVAIR and the Marine Corps unsuccessfully attempted to implement organic 
support at the intermediate and depot level of maintenance and supply.  However, there is 
little analytical evidence to indicate whether an OEM sustainment contract was the best 
decision. 
C. RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
1. Research Objectives 
 In this research, I analyzed the benefits and limitations of an OEM-CLS 
sustainment model for the life cycle of the Raven UAS.  First, I analyzed the supply and 
maintenance concepts from both operational and sustainment perspectives through the 
lens of doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and 
facilities (DOTMLPF) implications.  While cost is both an easy and important metric to 
analyze, it is only a single element that the program office must weigh when determining 
the best value sustainment model.  I explored the benefits and limitations of each aspect 








rather than quantitative and is based upon expert accounts from the UAS development, 
sustainment, and user communities that support and employ the Marine Corps’ Raven. 
 Secondly, I analyzed the costs for the Raven B procurement decision as 
well as the organic/CLS blended model of sustainment.  I compared the construct at the 
beginning of the Marine Corps’ Raven program in 2008 with the current costs of the 
2011 modified organic/CLS blended sustainment model.  The cost analysis includes an 
evaluation of whether the decision to implement OEM-CLS with AV has translated into 
significant monetary or other savings for the Marine Corps.   
2. Analysis Questions 
 What are the operational and logistical impacts of using a hybrid 
organic/CLS solution for supply and maintenance support of the 
RQ-11B Raven? 
 Is the increased cost of the modified CLS contract supporting the 
RQ-11B Raven worth the supply and maintenance benefits? 
D. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
Analysis of the data comes from an examination of the organization of UAS-
equipped and supporting units along with associated logistics agencies within the USMC.  
The information provides insights on how the Marines support the Raven through supply 
chain management and maintenance procedures in consonance with the OEM.  This 
study conducted a BCA comparing the sustainment costs of the current Marine Corps 
ISR Raven DDL program with those of the original Raven analog variant. The results of 
this study help set benchmark guidelines for future UAS acquisitions and their associated 
sustainment strategies.   
E. ORGANIZATION 
In Chapter I, I present a broad overview of this report and lay out the general road 
map of the research through a purpose, problem statement, research questions, 








In Chapter II, I provide an overview of both the Department of Defense (DoD) 
and USMC initial involvement with the development, procurement, and employment of 
some of America’s first military unmanned aerial systems.  I also outline some of the 
trends in global, national, and DoD priorities to support the rising development and use of 
unmanned technologies and provide supporting evidence from spending analysis and 
system inventories.   
In Chapter III, I present the case study of the RQ-11B Raven DDL beginning with 
an introductory history of the weapon system and the SUAS program starting with its 
technological predecessors, its mission, and its technical capabilities.   
In Chapter IV, I provide a summary of the evolution in sustainment 
methodologies and details on the Raven’s operational, maintenance, and support 
structures using the DOTMLPF analysis method, including lessons learned from the 
operating forces and supporting establishments.  I also provide a look at the Raven’s 
original programmed sustainment strategy and an analysis of the major costs and current 
operational sustainment constructs. In addition, I include a description of this case study 
that can be applied to future Marine Corps acquisition and sustainment endeavors. 
In Chapter V, I answer the research questions I propose in Chapter I, summarize 
the findings of the research, and present recommendations for further research and study. 
F. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
I expect that this analysis will aid the USMC and NAVAIR to make improved 










Experience in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OEF) has proven that UASs are invaluable to American warfighters. In particular, UASs 
designed for reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) have proven to 
be relatively low-cost assets used for acquiring tactical intelligence.  These systems have 
been in regular use since the early 1990s and range in size and sophistication from very 
small systems that can be launched by hand for short-range operations to high-altitude 
systems that can acquire much of the same information as reconnaissance satellites (Best, 
2011, p. 2). 
A. SHORT HISTORY: DOD UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS 
Although the first documented use of unmanned aircraft was for attack during the 
American Civil War, the U.S. has only seriously experimented with unmanned aerial 
systems since World War I.  However, only after World War II did the DoD effectively 
develop or use UASs in training and combat, such as the AQM-34 Firebee in Southeast 
Asia.  The AQM-34s were originally developed in the 1950s as aerial target drones; 
however, they were later adapted for use as intelligence-gathering assets during the 
Vietnam War (Gertler, 2012, p. 1).   
Its use was limited compared to manned aircraft conducting similar missions at 
the time, and although successful, it did not initiate the current proliferation of UASs 
across the globe.  There was an American resurgence of interest in UASs in the 1980s, 
especially when Israel experienced great success using unmanned systems in Lebanon in 
1982.  In addition, fundamental developments revived interest globally.  One change was 
the reduced cost of unmanned technologies and advent of cheaper innovations (i.e., using 
the derivative of radio-controlled model aircraft).  This shift toward using smaller, lower-
cost systems also had the advantages of reduced weight, volume, power consumption, 
and inexpensive modular electronic components (Sweetman, 1985).  However, the 








Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990–1991 for their operational utility and relatively 
low cost.  The well-publicized incident in which a troop of Iraqi soldiers apparently 
surrendered to a UAS also helped (Nader, 2007, p. 7).  
 The advantages of using UASs in ever-increasing ranges and numbers of 
operations are continually revealed, documented, and analyzed.  Examples of success 
range from missions in combat to military operations other than war (MOOTW) 
throughout the world; these include battle damage assessments over Kosovo in 1999, 
aerial pictures to assist with relief efforts in the wake of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, and 
most especially, in combat throughout the enduring Global War on Terror (GWOT) since 
2001 (Gertler, 2012, p. i).    
Today, with U.S. UAS inventory reaching nearly 7,500, there are hundreds of 
configurations and unique platforms of UASs in service for military, civilian, and 
commercial use worldwide.  This does not include ground-based platforms, maritime 
systems, or those in development (Gertler, 2012, p. 8).  The size, aeronautical design, and 
mission of these systems vary greatly: from very small to extremely large, from rotary-
wing to fixed-wing, and from aerial reconnaissance to delivering lethal precision-guided 
munitions.  The U.S. military is by far the heaviest user of UASs, levying the largest 
demand on American manufacturers, who possess over 64% of the total world market 
share.  The remaining share belongs to Israeli companies (4%), European companies 
(3%), other companies (14%), and unawarded contracts (15%; Fulghum, 2012, p. 70).  
The growing UAS market involved purchases of over $42 billion for research and 
development (R&D) and production in 2011 (Fulghum, 2012, p. 68). 
In order to keep up with increasing operational demand, the DoD spends billions 
of American defense dollars annually on researching, developing, procuring, and 
sustaining these systems.  According to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]) in the 2011 DoD UAS road map, the number 
of hours flown by American UAS platforms (depicted in Figure 1) has increased by 








Just a year later, in November 2010, the Army reported over 1 million UAS combat flight 
hours, including small unmanned aircraft.   
 
Figure 1.   UAS Flight Hours, 1996–Present 
(USD[AT&L], 2011) 
The current inventory of U.S. unmanned aerial systems is 10 times greater than it 
was 20 years ago (Fulghum, 2012).  The U.S. President’s 2011 budget included over $6 
billion for R&D, procurement, and operations and maintenance (O&M) for aerial systems 
alone, which is more than double what it was in 2005.  The President’s projected budgets 
for 2012 through 2015 feature nearly identical sums (Gertler, 2012).  The overall focus 
on the acquisitions of unmanned systems has been trending unrelentingly upward since 
the 1990s, only declining slightly with the decrease in combat operations in Iraq over the 
last two years.  
In an effort to better manage its rapidly expanding UAS force, the DoD organized 
its systems into various categories.  Formerly called tiers, the different types of UASs are 
now classified by groups, distinguished by size, weight, and flight endurance as shown in 
Figure 2.  Group 5 includes the largest UASs of these categories, which includes those 








echelon is Group 4, which includes UASs with similar weight characteristics as Group 5 
but with flight endurances less than 180 hours. 
 
Figure 2.   DoD Unmanned Aircraft Capabilities by Program 
(USD[AT&L], 2011) 
Group 2 encompasses medium-range small tactical UASs (STUAS), to which 
battlefield commanders have even greater access.  They weigh between 21 and 55 
pounds, fly no higher than 3500 feet above ground level (AGL), and fly only as fast and 
as long as the systems in Group 3.   
Finally, Group 1 incorporates the small platforms (SUAS; less than 20 pounds), 
which have a shorter on-station time than their larger counterparts.  Group 1 possesses 
the greatest number of systems than all the other groups combined, comprising 90% of all 
systems in the DoD’s inventory (Gertler, 2012).  However, sometimes both inadequate 








cause issues with the acquisition and effective sustainment of this important subset of 
UASs.   
The range of missions and capabilities assigned to unmanned aircraft is expanding 
as these systems are projected, with few exceptions, to assume nearly every manned 
aircraft mission in the future.  Nearly all current UASs are exclusively developed for 
RSTA or ISR with communication relay capability.  However, “weaponizing” 
intelligence-gathering UASs with precision-guided munitions for strike missions is 
becoming more commonplace.  Now a new category of UAS is in development 
specifically designed for direct combat action.  Unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs) 
will have greater speed, payload capacity, and stealth than current ISR models, with 
attack/strike missions as their primary tasking.   
Other potential roles of UASs are expected to materialize in the not-too-distant 
future.  These additional roles include electronic warfare, air-to-air combat, search and 
rescue, aerial refueling, and cargo resupply.  Among new roles for UASs is the U.S. Navy 
and Marine Corps’ effort to develop and employ a UAS capable of cargo resupply either 
at sea or on land.  A commercially-developed rotary-wing UAS is currently in 
Afghanistan undergoing user evaluations.   
B. U.S. MARINE CORPS UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM OVERVIEW 
The Marine Corps continues to refine its UAS concept of operations (CONOPS) a 
half century after it started experimenting with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the 
1960s.  UAV technological and employment concepts started in the 1950s when the 
Marines, in collaboration with the Navy, developed the XRON-1 Rotorcycle (produced 
by the Gyrodyne Company of America).  The XRON-1 was a manned mini-helicopter 
conceptually intended to provide an escape vehicle for downed pilots in treacherous or 
otherwise un-navigable enemy territory (Gyrodyne Helicopter Historical Foundation 
[GHHF], 1999).  Although the XRON-1 was never adopted, the Navy continued to 








mini-helicopter called the QH-50 Drone Anti-Submarine Helicopter (DASH).  The Navy 
intended to use the DASH to remotely deliver depth charges.    
In 1968, the DoD’s Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), in 
collaboration with Gyrodyne, commenced the modification of the QH-50D, as shown in 
Figure 3, under the Nite Panther Program concept in response to an urgent Marine 
operational requirement. The Marines’ employment concept was to launch the system 
from ships steaming near enemy littorals, fly it to targeted beachheads, and use it to 
conduct reconnaissance before troops disembarked for their amphibious landing.  The 
system had a daylight TV camera, a nighttime TV camera, a still photographic camera, 
and a laser rangefinder, all supported by a control station mounted on a truck equipped 
with the target control system.  Successfully tested and adopted, the three systems 
procured were sequentially lost in three days’ time after launching into Vietnam in April 
1968.  The technology developed from the Nite Panther remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) 
was used in other programs; however, the Marine Corps did not integrate unmanned 
systems in its operations again until the mid-1980s (GHHF, 1999).  
Figure 3.   The Nite Panther RPV and Control Station—1968 
(GHHF, 1999) 
The Corps established its first RPV platoon at Camp Lejeune in 1984, 








the first time.  The 42-man platoon’s mission was assisting in acquiring targets for 
artillery and naval gunfire as well as adjusting fires.  The unit was issued four Mastiff-3 
mini-RPVs, with which the Marines both trained and conducted testing trials but never 
used in real-world operations.   
The Mastiff-3, designed and manufactured by the Israeli company Tadiran 
Electronic Systems, was controlled by five Marines and had a gross weight over 250 
pounds, a range of 100 kilometers, and a flight endurance of nearly seven hours (USMC 
History Division, 1984).  Although the Mastiff-3 was the first relatively small short-range 
unmanned aerial vehicle in the Marines’ inventory, the Corps first operationally used 
unmanned systems in 1986 when the Navy selected the RQ-2 Pioneer as its standard 
short-range RPV.   
The Pioneer, technically a derivative of both the Israeli Scout and Mastiff RPVs, 
was built in the U.S. by AAI Corporation.  The system weighed over 400 pounds and was 
launched by rocket assist (shipboard), by catapult, or from a runway.  The Marines 
employed the Pioneer and its upgraded variants from 1986 through about 2007, when it 
was replaced with the Group 3 Shadow UAS.  
At the same time that the Navy and Marine Corps acquired the Pioneer UAV in 
1986, AV designed a smaller battlefield UAV called the FQM-151 Pointer UAV.  The 
Pointer was significantly smaller than the Pioneer, weighing only 10 pounds, and served 
the Marines as its first man-portable, hand-launched system for infantrymen to see 
beyond line of sight (BLOS).  The Pointer provided color and infrared (IR) video from 
front or side views, operated with a global positioning system (GPS) to auto-navigate, 
executed man-in-the-loop control, and remained recoverable in obstructed areas.  The 
logistical footprint for the Pointer was drastically smaller than any other unmanned 
system the Marines had used before, and it was critical to units needing immediate 
intelligence on the battlefield; it essentially serves as the model for small fixed-wing 
UASs to this day (Munson, 2000).  The Pointer served the Marine Corps from 1990 until 








The Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) developed the Dragon Eye in 2000 for the 
Marines.  AV was selected to optimize the design for enhanced manufacturability and 
reliability, and the system first flew in 2001. After testing and user trials, the Dragon Eye 
reached initial operational capability (IOC) in 2003, when the Marines deployed it in 
support of OIF.  The system was smaller, weighing about five pounds, and served as the 
Corps’ smallest tactical reconnaissance and surveillance UAS yet.  The Dragon Eye 
fulfilled the Navy’s over-the-hill (OTH) reconnaissance initiative and the Marines’ 
interim small unit remote scouting system (I-SURSS) requirement, although other micro 
and small UAVs were in development as well.  The Dragon Eye, however, was soon 
afterwards targeted for replacement in 2006.  The Marine Corps decided to transition to 
the current USMC acquisition program of record fielding the organic battlefield SUAS—
the RQ-11 Pathfinder Raven, which started its changeover in the field in 2008. 
Among all the programs managed by the Navy and Marine Corps unmanned 
systems project office, the Raven is the workhorse; it has the most total systems in the 
Services’ entire UAS inventory, at 425 fielded systems.  Each Raven system contains 
three individual air vehicles, totaling 1,275 aircraft fielded systems—three times as many 
as the next most numerous UAS in the Navy’s Group 1 inventory (Wasp; NAVAIR, 
2012).  The DoD owns over 5,300 RQ-11 air vehicles in service with the Marines, Air 
Force, Army, and United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).  The Wasp 
also comes in a distant second to the Raven at a little over 900 systems in the total DoD 
inventory (Gertler, 2012).  Although the Raven does not compare in capability to the 
larger, more sophisticated UASs like the Global Hawk, Reaper, or Predator, the sheer 
number of systems and resources dedicated to managing the system requires a high level 
of attentiveness to deal with support strategies at any level of the DoD. 
C. USMC UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM ORGANIZATION 
Since 2001, the demand for dedicated aerial reconnaissance assets has grown 
rapidly during the course of the War on Terror.  In concert with the DoD, the Marine 








in its vision for a UAS family of systems (FoS).  The Corps has evolved, developed, and 
executed its procurement and fielding strategies for improved unmanned systems at every 
level of the MAGTF.  Today, the Marine Corps’ UAS CONOPS divides its unmanned 
systems requirement into three levels that coincide with the various echelons of command 
in the MAGTF. The smaller but more numerous systems (Group 1) directly support lower 
tactical units such as company- and battalion-sized elements, whereas the larger systems 
(Groups 2 and 3) support higher levels of command such as the Marine Expeditionary 
Unit (MEU) or Regimental Combat Team (RCT; Marine Corps Combat Development 
Command [MCCDC], 2009). 
All USMC Group 1 systems are considered organic assets to battalion-sized units 
and smaller; they are typically owned and operated with limited maintenance by Marine 
infantrymen engaged in combat operations.  Although the Raven is the Marines’ only 
official SUAS PoR today, the Group 1 program office at the NAVAIR manages 
numerous program initiatives responding to relatively recent urgent needs statements.  
These other systems do not typically appear by name in high-level DoD or Navy and 
Marine Corps budget/funding profiles; however, they are part of the SUAS program and 
may eventually become standalone PoRs.  Those systems include the AV-produced Puma 
All Environment (AE) UAS (a fixed-wing sister platform to the Raven with greater 
capability); Honeywell’s RQ-16B T-Hawk vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) micro air 
vehicle (MAV); and the AV-manufactured Wasp micro unmanned aerial vehicle 
(MUAV).  The two latter platforms have been in regular use by Marines since around 
2008 and 2009 respectively (NAVAIR, 2012). 
The larger unmanned systems in Groups 2 and 3 are organic to Marine unmanned 
aerial vehicle squadrons (VMUs).  VMUs are a reorganized and re-designated form of the 
previously known RPV platoons, fulfilling a similar role of non-organic aerial 
intelligence support to battalion-size and larger units. VMUs are subordinate to the 
MAGTF Air Wing and are either task-organized and attached to the headquarters of 








difference between organic UASs and VMU assets is that the image output from VMUs 
must be pushed or requested through designated intelligence channels (MCCDC, 2009).  
Today’s inventory of Marine Corps UASs in Groups 2 and 3 include larger, more 
capable ISR assets.  The Group 2 STUAS platform for the Navy and the Marines is Scan 
Eagle, a system built by Institu, Inc., a subsidiary of the Boeing Company.  Although the 
operation and support of Scan Eagle is currently contracted through Boeing, the system is 
considered an organic asset to VMUs since its introduction in 2008.  Fulfilling the Group 
3 tactical UAS (TUAS) role is the previously mentioned RQ-7 Shadow, designed and 
manufactured by AAI Corporation (NAVAIR, 2012).   
One future UAS capability currently under the NAVAIR’s assessment is an air 
platform called the RQ-21 Integrator, which is also built by the Institu/Boeing team and 
has greater avionic and sensor capability than its predecessors.  The Integrator is intended 
for maritime and ground ISR/RSTA as a Group 3 system, which will replace both the 
Group 2 Scan Eagle and Group 3 Shadow starting around the fourth quarter of 2013 
(NAVAIR, 2012).   
The Marine Corps is also acquiring a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) rotary-
wing unmanned helicopter for unmanned aerial cargo resupply.  Lockheed Martin’s 
KMAX beat out Boeing’s Hummingbird in a down-select competition and is now 
accumulating data in active mission testing and user evaluations in Afghanistan to 
identify its future operational and sustainment impacts (Peterson & Staley, 2011).  
Although the Marines and the Navy are leading the acquisition efforts for the cargo 
system, all Services are awaiting their opportunity to procure the newest unpiloted 
resupply capability.  The DoD will categorize the cargo UAS in Group 4 of its unmanned 
systems. 
D. ACQUISITIONS PROCESS AND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 
Unlike most acquisitions processes in the DoD, the Navy and Marine Corps have 
a unique relationship that leads to unique UAS acquisition processes.  While the Air 








all their aircraft, the Marines rely on the Navy’s program management offices at the 
NAVAIR. The NAVAIR and the Marine Corps’ principal development and acquisitions 
agencies are tied together with a series of operating agreements.  The Marine Corps 
begins its acquisitions process by brainstorming and conceptualizing solutions in 
response to needs statements or perceived capability gaps.  The Marine Corps uses the 
Expeditionary Force Development System (EFDS), denoted in Figure 4, which is a four-
phased process that is synchronized with the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and 
Execution System (PPBES) and the Defense Acquisition System (DAS). It is a 
coordinated effort, led and managed by the Deputy Commandant for Combat 
Development and Integration, Headquarters Marine Corps (CD&I), who also acts as the 
commanding general (CG) of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command 









Figure 4.   The Marine Corps Expeditionary Force Development System 
(MCCDC, 2008) 
Subordinate to CD&I/MCCDC are its working groups, the Combat Capabilities 
Directorate (CDD) and the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL).  The CDD is the 
custodian of the EFDS and analyzes and develops solutions for the Marine Forces 
(MARFORs).  The CDD coordinates with Marine Corps advocates, proponents, 
MARFORs, and supporting establishments to ensure that the fielding of warfighting 
capabilities is integrated across the DOTMLPF solution framework.  The MCWL is a 
combination think tank and laboratory.  The MCWL analyzes and tests new and 
emerging concepts from today’s industry and individual Marines to determine if they 
would function in combat and if they are a solution for a current problem (MCCDC, 
2008).  The CDD and MCWL collaboratively decide whether a material or non-material 
solution will fulfill a capability gap and then forward their recommendation up to the 








Once the MROC approves a material solution, the acquisition process for the 
equipment branches out into a series of tangential activities managed by either the Marine 
Corps Systems Command (MCSC; for land-based equipment) or the NAVAIR (for all 
aircraft).  Both the MCSC and NAVAIR report directly to the Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN[RDA]), shown in Figure 5, and 
work together alongside the CD&I/MCCDC as needed to provide the Marine Corps 
warfighter with the capabilities to execute missions efficiently and successfully.  Before 
2007, Marine Corps UASs were managed by the MCSC under Product Group 11 (PG-11) 
for MAGTF Command and Control (C2), Weapons & Sensors Development and 
Integration (MC2I).   
 









Today, the NAVAIR’s Program Executive Office for Unmanned Aviation and 
Strike Weapons (PEO[U&W]) acts as the Marine Corps’ acquisition advocate for UASs.  
PEO(U&W) oversees 10 program offices responsible for meeting the cost, schedule, and 
performance requirements of their assigned programs.  Only one of the 10 program 
managers deals directly with the Marines’ current unmanned systems of record.  A 
Marine colonel is currently assigned the leadership and management responsibilities of 
PMA-263, which governs all efforts associated with the acquisitions process for the Navy 
and Marine Corps’ Group 3 TUAS (Shadow), Group 2 STUAS (Scan Eagle), and Group 
1 SUAS (Raven).  PMA-263 is also responsible for managing the other SUAS programs 
(T-Hawk and the Wasp) previously mentioned in this section.  Figure 6 shows the 
interfaces between PMA-263 and other external organizations.   
 
Figure 6.   The Integrated Product Team for Group 1 UASs 
(MCSC, 2008c) 
E. SUSTAINMENT 
The estimated percentage of money spent on O&M of a typical weapon system 





























In general, during the lifecycle of a weapon system a significantly larger 
amount of money gets spent in operating and maintaining the system than 
acquiring it.  Hence, efficient logistics systems, including transportation, 
inventory management, modifications and maintenance activities, are 
critically important for containing the lifecycle costs of weapon systems 
and for maintaining the highest level of military readiness given the extant 
fiscal constraints. (Apte & Kang, 2008, abstract)  
Figure 7 depicts a notional profile of program expenditures by cost category over the 
system life cycle (Matthews, 2011).  With the increasing length of time that the DoD 
retains its weapon systems in its inventory through programs such as the Service 
Extension Program (SEP), many weapon systems are experiencing greater percentages of 
the total LCC spent on O&M (Apte & Kang, 2008).  Most weapon systems are designed 
for a life cycle of about 20 years.  Today’s unmanned aircraft, however, are designed and 
manufactured to incorporate operational lives of five to 10 years.  
 
Figure 7.   Illustrative Diagram of a Program Life Cycle 
(Matthews, 2011) 
Before equipment is fielded, the DoD requires that all military materiel have plans 








throughout its life cycle (USD[AT&L], 2008, p. 28).  According to the USD(AT&L), life 
cycle sustainment planning will be flexible and performance-oriented with considerations 
that “include supply; maintenance; transportation; sustaining engineering; data 
management; configuration management; HSI [human systems integration]; environment, 
safety (including explosives safety), and occupational health; protection of critical 
program information and anti-tamper provisions; supportability; and interoperability” 
(USD[AT&L], 2008, p. 28).     
This thesis assumes that the term sustainment relies mainly upon supply and 
maintenance considerations.  The DoD’s policy for maintenance of military materiel, as 
laid out in DoD Directive (DoDD) 4151.18 (USD[AT&L], 2004), states that military 
maintenance programs should achieve inherent performance, safety, and reliability levels 
of the equipment.  The policy also states that, regardless of where maintenance occurs, 
“throughout the life cycle of military materiel, maintenance programs shall be adjusted 
periodically to improve maintenance agility, increase operational availability, and reduce 
life-cycle total ownership costs” (USD[AT&L], 2004, p. 2).  However, it is important to 
understand that as the life cycle of a weapon system progresses, the decisions on its 
support design exponentially affect the total cost of sustainment and, at some point, the 
cost becomes unchangeable (see Figure 8).  Therefore, those who design sustainment 
strategies and those with decision-making authority have the difficult position of 
balancing trade-offs between spending less money for a potentially less effective support 
system or investing more money for more comprehensive support.  The grim reality is 
that acquisition and military leadership working within a budget need to learn how to 
make sustainment decisions as early as possible in the system’s life in order to spend less 









Figure 8.   Illustrative Diagram of Decision Timing on Life Cycle Cost 
(Acquisitions Department, 2011) 
The DoD’s maintenance policy requires that the sustainment program “employ 
maintenance concepts that optimize process technologies, organizational structures, and 
operating concepts to deliver efficient and effective performance to the operating forces” 
(USD[AT&L], 2004, p. 2). Determining whether a piece of equipment is inherently 
governmental or commercial helps determine the type of support strategy chosen or 
designed to sustain it throughout its life cycle.  The support structure must, as it states in 
DoDD 4151.18 (USD[AT&L], 2004), “provide organic maintenance for inherently 
Governmental and core capability requirements” (p. 2) while “non-core capability 
requirements shall be satisfied using competitive sourcing, as appropriate … to lower 
costs and improve performance across the full spectrum of maintenance activities” (p. 2).  
From within this guidance, there are many maintenance support structure alternatives for 
sustaining a weapon system during its life cycle, including organic or unique military 
capabilities, performance-based logistics arrangements, commercial sector support, 








Due to the rapid ascension of UASs on the modern-day battlefield and the 
associated rate of technological innovation, the military increasingly relies upon 
commercial support.  Compared to the larger, military-equipped UASs, small UASs are 
typically COTS systems that are updated and modified relatively frequently.  Therefore, 
there has not been much emphasis on establishing a robust organic capability to sustain 
these smaller systems.  
An organic sustainment option is a military-oriented supply and maintenance 
construct in which Service members conduct the maintenance and provide supply support 
using the military Service’s procedures and resources.  The other primary option to 
sustaining the smaller UASs is the purchase of contracted logistics services, whereby the 
supply and maintenance of a system is provided through some non-governmental 
commercial agency, which typically involves the OEM.  However, there are hybrid 
alternatives that partner the military and government with commercial service providers 
in what is sometimes called a modified CLS.1   
Regardless of alternatives, cost and performance analyses are conducted during 
the acquisition process to determine the best value sustainment option, for which there 
are numerous considerations.  Generic operating and support (O&S) cost structure 
elements include support personnel, unit-level consumables, intermediate-level 
maintenance, depot-level maintenance, contractor support, sustainment support,2 and 
indirect support  (DoD, 2012, Chapter 3.1.3.3).  
Especially applicable in today’s technically-advanced, fast-paced, and persistent 
battle space, American warriors need to maintain a competitive advantage over their 
enemies and be assured that the established supply chain and maintenance construct can 
                                                 
1 There is also a third standard option when a Service relies on the logistics infrastructure and activities 
of another Service.  This option is typically managed through a memorandum called an interservice support 
agreement (ISA or ISSA) and is applicable for supporting common systems and when activities are aboard 
common installations or in common facilities.   
2 Sustaining support includes the cost of replacement support equipment, modification kits, sustaining 








support them and their equipment.  In every aspect of program management, the DoD 
acquisition workforce is constantly challenged to balance cost, schedule, and 
performance.  In a business transaction, better performance generally warrants a higher 
initial price, as is the case not only at the onset of an acquisition initiative but also 
throughout its lifetime.  However, government and military practitioners involved with 
the acquisition process understand that there is increasingly limited capital available to 
today’s heavily-scrutinized Defense Department.  Therefore, not only is sustainability a 
key performance parameter (KPP) among the requirements for today’s weapon systems 
but so is affordability.  If acquisitions leaders fail to establish a proper sustainment 
strategy that is balanced against costs, they could severely affect the quality of support 





































III. THE USMC RAVEN PROGRAM 
A. HISTORY 
In this section, I expand on the background presented in Section B of Chapter II 
and specifically focus on the Raven program. 
1. USMC SUAS Origins 
The foundation for the current SUAS dates to the Marine Corps’ Airborne 
Remotely Operated Device (AROD) Program, initiated in the early 1980s. The AROD 
project was a part of the Exploratory Development Surveillance Program. It was 
continued as part of the 1986 Ground/Air Tele-robotics Systems (GATERS) Advanced 
Technology Demonstration program together with the ground-based Tele-operated 
Vehicle (TOV).  The AROD provided airborne reconnaissance and surveillance to the 
highly mobile multi-wheeled vehicle (HMMWV)-based TOV, which was developed to 
perform remote RSTA of up to 30 km (Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 
[SPAWAR], n.d.). The aerial device was intended to pass imagery information as well as 
perform radio relay and electronic warfare functions (Richardson, 1988, p. 22). 
The first AROD was a small ducted-fan VTOL air vehicle that could 
provide short-range aerial surveillance and, weighing only 40 pounds, was small enough 
to be carried by one person.  The AROD was connected to and controlled from a portable 
ground control station (GCS) by a tethered fiber optic data-link cable that provided the 
unit with electrical power and facilitated image relay and communications; the 
communications were backed up by a radio link.  The aerial device had limited endurance 
and payload capacity, restricted by the 5 km reel of optical fiber it carried to support a 2 
km round-trip or 5 km one-way mission.  At a price of about $3,000, the AROD was 
essentially a “combat expendable drone” (Richardson, 1988, p. 22).  Although developers 
successfully tested some its capabilities in free flight, the GATERS program canceled the 
AROD system due to a combination of limited funding and its instability in flight 








In 1989, the winner of a DoD competition for the Very Low-Cost UAV 
Program (VLC UAV) was AV’s 1986 private venture, the FQM-151 Pointer, which 
became the first hand-launched, back-packable, fixed-wing UAS employed initially by 
the Army and Marines.  The Pointer was first operationally deployed in 1991 in support 
of Operation Desert Storm alongside its larger AAI Pioneer UAV counterpart.  As 
described earlier, the Pointer served the Marines until 2008, when it was phased out and 
replaced by the Raven, although the Pointer still serves with Air Force and Special 
Operations units.  
Nearly a decade after the competition for the VLC UAV, the Marine 
Corps drafted a Fleet Marine Force operational need statement (FONS) for an I-SURSS 
in 1999; the FONS outlined the need for a small hand-launched, re-usable, fully 
autonomous UAS with interchangeable modular payloads and a laptop-computer–based 
GCS to provide over-the-hill RSTA and facilitate fire support missions (Hendrickson, 
2008, p. 66).  The NRL and the MCWL collaboratively created the Dragon Eye program 
to demonstrate the integration of technologies into the I-SURSS.  The NRL built a 
scaled-up prototype version of its micro tactical expendable (MITE) air vehicle, which 
was already under development for several years (Hewish, 2000).  The Dragon Eye 
prototype made its first flight in May 2000, and in 2001, the Marines took delivery of the 
system for limited technical assessments.  
In February 2002, an integrated product team (IPT) developed a draft 
evolutionary I-SURSS operational requirements document (ORD) that outlined an 
acquisition process to acquire and field a functional solution to the I-SURSS.  The draft 
ORD specified five increments (Block 0 through Block 4).  Blocks 0–1 addressed 
development of the aerial sensor; Blocks 2–4 addressed development of a “hand-
emplaced and munitions emplaced sensor in addition to the aerial sensor” (MCSC, 2008c, 
p. 6).   
In May 2002, the Marine Corps subsequently sponsored an industry-wide 








vendor delivering prototypes for evaluation.  The prototypes were tested and evaluated by 
Marines during a limited objective experiment (LOE) using the performance criteria in 
the draft ORD.  However, the experiments involving the advanced prototypes were 
interrupted when in September 2002, 1st Marine Division (MARDIV), 1st Marine 
Expeditionary Force (MEF), routed a universal needs statement (UNS) calling for 
immediate Dragon Eye UAS support to the operating forces in Iraq.  The NRL 
redesigned the I-SURSS program to meet the urgent need by upgrading a group of pre-
production systems and immediately deployed them to Iraq, where the Marines 
conducted extended user assessments concurrent with real-world missions until June 
2003.  Also in September 2002, the MCSC began managing the I-SURSS program as an 
abbreviated acquisition program (AAP) after the director of the MCWL and the CG 
MCSC reached an agreement to transition program management from the MCWL.   
In November 2003, the Corps awarded a sole-source contract to AV to 
optimize the design and manufacturing processes (Hendrickson, 2008, p. 66), and in 
September 2004, the small unite remote scouting system (SURSS) ORD was finally 
adopted.  In December 2004, the Milestone Decision Authorities (MDAs), the MCSC and 
PEO(U&W), established SURSS as a PoR, approved production to achieve the 
acquisition objective, and designated SURSS Block 0 as an acquisition category (ACAT) 
IV(T) program.  The Marine Corps employed Dragon Eye until 2008, after it had already 
begun research in 2006 for and approved its replacement to fulfill the Block 1 SURSS 
upgrade.   
2. RQ-11 Raven Origins 
There is a comprehensive study of the Raven UAS documented in the 
2011 Acquisition Research Symposium paper “Emerging Patterns in the Global Defense 
Industry,” authored by Raymond E. Franck, Ira Lewis, David Matthews, and Bernard 
Udis.  I derive the majority of this section’s information regarding the system’s early 








One of the numerous concurrent UAS initiatives within the DoD in the 
1970s and 1980s was when the Army sought to develop and field a relatively small 
unmanned RSTA capability directly into the hands of its artillerymen to enhance their 
target acquisition abilities.  An early project, initiated as a joint venture between the 
Army and the Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, Inc., in 1974, was a small 
battlefield RPV designated the MQM-105 Aquila.  However, after successful initial 
stages, the Aquila eventually lacked the technical performance to pass the testing criteria 
and the program was subsequently canceled in 1984.  This was due to a number of 
reasons, one of which was requirements creep.  After developers increased Aquila’s size 
from its original 146 pounds to 250 pounds, it was still unable to physically support the 
weight of a growing number and type of user-required sensors (Franck, Lewis, Bernard, 
& Matthews, 2011, p. 65). 
Although the Army investigated unmanned technologies for decades 
before and after the Aquila program, the requirements for a small UAV (SUAV) 
capability for dismounted forces fighting in urban terrain were finally matured and 
officially demonstrated during the FY1998–2002 Military Operations in Urban Terrain, 
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (MOUT ACTD)—long after relatively 
small UAVs were operational. 
Following the MOUT ACTD program’s demonstration in 2000 and the 
extended user evaluations, the AV-manufactured FQM-151 Pointer had proven to be a 
clear success by meeting the majority of the SUAV program’s 33 acquisition-stated 
requirement areas.  Although it finished third among a field of 27 other technological 
solutions, the Pointer was chosen to advance through the extended ACTD.  However, 
even after further development, the Pointer still had important deficiencies; it was too big 
and overly heavy (Franck et al., 2011, pp. 66–67).  
The ACTD spurred USSOCOM interest based on the recently published 
special operations miniature robotic vehicle capstone requirements document (SOMROV 








family of small, light, ground, air, and maritime robotic vehicles. Also initiated in 2000 
was a derivative of the SOMROV CRD, the USSOCOM for the rucksack portable 
unmanned aerial vehicle operational requirements document (ORD RPUAV) that further 
articulated the small UAV requirement (USSOCOM, 2004).   
The ORD outlined that the small UAV system should be “capable of rapid 
launch from field locations, short operating ranges, extended mission duration, and a low 
profile recovery from unprepared areas,” while “providing dedicated imagery and sensor 
data to the small unit for over-the-hill and around-the-corner employment” (USSOCOM, 
2004, pp. 5–7).  Furthermore, it stated that the system should “have the ability to be 
carried, launched, controlled and recovered by a single operator” (USSOCOM, 2004, pp. 
5–7).  At the onset of both OEF and OIF, USSOCOM procured a limited number of 
Pointer systems to satisfy a combat mission need statement (C-MNS; USSOCOM, 2004, 
p. 4). 
Having its own acquisition executive with independent authority, 
USSOCOM provided momentum to the UAS program demonstrated at MOUT ACTD.  
Subsequently, AV was awarded a contract in 2001 (with the U.S. Army Natick Labs) to 
research and develop a smaller, lighter air vehicle with the same capabilities as the 
Pointer. USSOCOM was able to bypass the traditionally cumbersome DoD acquisition 
process to proceed with the development of the UAS faster and less formally using 
system requirements derived through the spiral development process (Franck et al., 2011, 
p. 69).   
Generally, spiral development is an iterative cycle in which first, the 
system concept is introduced to users; second, the users define system requirements; 
third, a prototype is designed based on user requirements; fourth, users evaluate the 
requirements and prototype; and fifth, users generate new or updated requirements and 
design guidelines based on previous steps.  The process is then repeated; each successive 








prototype—providing USSOCOM an initial reference point for development and 
feedback (Franck et al., 2011, p. 70).   
Using the spiral method in this case, USSOCOM and Natick made 
substantial improvements in making relatively low-cost prototypes and quickly ending 
with a user-accepted product.  The resultant platform was the Flashlight SUAV that, after 
successive feedback and development, yielded the initial variant of the RQ-11 Pathfinder 
Raven UAV (Franck et al., 2011, p. 67).  Around the time that it bought several Pointer 
UAVs in response to several urgent C-MNS, USSOCOM also procured the Raven in 
2002 for missions in support of OIF and OEF.  Then, the U.S. Army’s program manager 
for UASs (USA PM-UAS), with renewed interest and funding, sent an improved Raven 
configuration based on user feedback into production a short four months after low-rate 
initial production (LRIP) of Raven Block I began in May 2003.  As noted earlier with the 
special operations acquisitions process, urgency oftentimes outpaces the traditional 
process, as was demonstrated when the RPUAV ORD was officially signed in 2004, two 
years after the actual procurement of the system that met its requirements (Franck et al., 
2011, p. 70).  Incidentally, approval of the RPUAV ORD occurred in parallel with but 
independent of the approval of the Marine Corps’ I-SURSS ORD in 2004. 
Because the Raven was largely developed and procured through the 
USSOCOM acquisitions process, integrating the system into the mainstream Army 
proved difficult.  The system lacked any formal doctrine usually developed through 
traditional acquisition channels.  When Army leadership and operating forces realized the 
Raven’s effectiveness, “it was outside of the mainstream research, development, and 
acquisition system” (Franck et al., 2011, p. 71).  Therefore, the Army struggled to quickly 
develop doctrine and incorporate it into their formal training pipeline.  However, after 
years of use and refinement, the Raven has become the foundation of the Army’s small 
unit organic intelligence gathering tactics.  The Army has continued its successful 
working relationship with AV for the Raven since 2003, from which both the Army and 








3. The Marine Corps Adopts the Raven 
In establishing the I-SURRS ORD, the Marine Corps planned to pursue a 
rapid acquisition approach to quickly field new UAS technology and capabilities to its 
warfighters.  Therefore, the Group I IPT planned to execute an evolutionary acquisition 
approach with two incremental developments to meet final desired SURSS requirements.  
AV’s RQ-14 Dragon Eye fulfilled the Block 0 increment, which enabled the Marines to 
field a capability as quickly as possible.  The Dragon Eye represented 75% of the 
Marines’ desired final capability; however, the second increment, Block 1, was planned 
to fulfill 100% of the Marines’ requirements.   
In 2006, the Marine Corps changed direction somewhat and searched for 
alternatives to fulfill the SURSS Block 1 requirements, thereby eliminating the interim 
status of the program.  It chose to both adopt the 2004 USSOCOM RPUAV ORD and 
utilize the Army’s procurement of an equivalent system—the RQ-11B Raven.  This 
approach reduced costs and risk because the Raven had already entered FRP and was 
based on mature technology.  Subsequently, the Corps received an initial fielding 
decision in the second quarter of FY2008 and a full fielding decision in the fourth quarter 
of FY2008, both of which built on the acquisition decisions already made by the Army, 









Figure 9.   SURSS Program Schedule 
(MCCDC, 2008) 
The Marine Corps procured the Raven systems in parallel with the Army 
and USSOCOM systems on a modified firm-fixed price (FFP) production contract with 
AV, within which there was sufficient AV production capacity to meet the Corps’ 
procurement goals through the expiration of the contract in 2010.  The Marine Corps 
negotiated a support strategy that maximized the reuse of Army-supplied materiel and 
delegated systems engineering responsibility to the Army (MCCDC, 2008, p. 16).  
However, the Marines incorporated its Group I IPT into the Army’s IPT as a voting 
member on the combined Configuration Control Board (CCB).  The agreement stipulated 
that future changes to the Raven system program be vetted through a joint configuration 
control process that ensured Marine Corps requirements continued to be met (MCCDC, 
2008, p. 12). 
It was at this time (October 2006) that program management of the Marine 
Corps’ UAS acquisitions began transitioning from the MCSC to PEO(U&W). PMA-263 
and the USA PM-UAS began sharing program management responsibilities with the 








Figure 5 in Chapter II, within the organization to facilitate the complex relationship 
between the numerous proponents and stakeholders (MCSC, 2008c, p. 7).   
The MROC approved the Group I UAS Operational and Organization 
(O&O) Concept in September 2006, and it became the Marine Corps’ source document 
describing Marine SUAS capability.  The O&O also outlined SUAS key performance 
parameters, operational concept, logistics strategy, and initial fielding distribution 
throughout the Marine Corps (MCCDC, 2011). 
B. RQ-11B RAVEN DIGITAL DATA LINK 
In October 2008, less than a year after the Marine Corps reached IOC for the 
Raven, the USA PM-UAS approved (with PMA-263 concurrence) an engineering change 
proposal to integrate the upgrade from the Raven’s four- and eight-channel analog 
variants to AV’s latest DDL capability.  With the planned procurement of the upgraded 
Ravens, the Army and Marine Corps decided to continue their relationship beyond the 
2010 expiration of the original agreement and modified the contract statement of work 
(SOW; MCSC, 2011, p. 1).  
AV’s proprietary DDL is a small “broadband digital network node to enable 
enhanced command and control of a small UAS. The DDL is IP-based to enable 
maximum flexibility and interoperability between small airborne and ground systems 
with limited power availability, and bandwidth-efficient to maximize the number of 
systems that can operate within an area” (AV, 2011).  The AV upgrade of the Raven 
involves both retrofitting active analog systems in service as well as manufacturing new 
production units to meet Army and Marine objectives. 
In 2011, PMA-263 updated the O&O to reflect changes in the Raven’s budgeting 
estimates, its concept of support, and the distribution of systems.  Table 1 shows the 
Group I distribution.  The current fielding plan for the Raven is a continuation of the 
schedule produced for the analog systems, although the initial fielding of DDL systems 
occurred in the third quarter of FY2011, with full fielding still planned for FY2014 

















C. MISSION AND SYSTEM CAPABILITIES 
1. Mission 
The Raven’s mission is to provide a low cost, low altitude, remote aerial 
“reconnaissance and surveillance, target acquisition (RSTA), force protection (FP) and 
convoy security, battle damage assessment (BDA), for light infantry, dismounted 
warfighters, and military operations in urban terrain (MOUT)” (AV, n.d.).  For the 
Marines, the Raven provides organic OTH RSTA for the MAGTF’s lowest level ground, 
aviation, and logistics combat elements (GCE, ACE, and LCE)—battalion-sized units 
and below.  The Marine Corps has fielded most of its systems to infantry, light armored 
reconnaissance (LAR), and tank battalions, as well as smaller quantities to other units 
such as artillery battalions, Marine wing support squadrons (MWSS), combat engineer 
battalions (CEBs), headquarters and service (H&S) battalions, and Marine logistics group 
(MLG) units.  Figure 10 depicts a Marine hand-launching the Raven in the field.  
According to a 2009 report on the Raven’s employment during OIF by the Marine Corps 
Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL), the Raven augmented the use of theater- and 
national-level ISR assets.   
Destination Qty 
I MEF 100 
II MEF 105 
III MEF 53 
MARSOC (Special Operations Command) 57 
MARFORRES (Reserves) 71 
MCSC/TECOM (Supporting Establishment) 17 










Figure 10.   A Marine Hand-Launches the Raven UAS  
(AV, n.d.) 
The Raven did not reduce the Marines’ reliance on non-organic assets, but 
having access to available higher-level ISR assets “did not minimize the effectiveness or 
value of a dedicated battalion and company level ISR platform” (MCCLL, 2009, p. 8). 
The Raven was employed by Marines in Iraq to support a variety of missions (MCCLL, 
2009, p. 9): 
 forward operating base (FOB) security; 
 surveillance of selected avenues of approach, or rat lines; 
 reconnaissance prior to raids, and cordon and knocks; 
 population observation (pattern of life analysis); 
 deception operations; 
 cache sweeps; and 








2. Components and Capabilities 
The Raven is battery-powered, using either a single-use LiS02 battery or a 
rechargeable LiIon battery via DC or AC inputs.  The different payloads consist of 
various sensors and cameras that provide visual feedback to the GCS, which is used to 
control the aircraft, load missions, and display the near-real-time video. Remote units can 
also gain access to video and location information by using a remote video terminal 
(RVT), which functions much like the control station.  The Raven system also enables the 
operator to conduct training by connecting the GCS to a standard laptop computer by 
using a software simulation package.  The GCS includes telemetry technology that allows 
the operator to control and monitor the SUAS from a distance via radio wave or network 
transmission and reception, which also provides the system with a capability of both 
manual and autonomous flight.  The handheld control unit is the operator’s display and 
entry/control device, while the radio frequency (RF) receiver/transmitter (R/T) unit 
contains the up- and downlink communications radios.  The Raven B cruises at about 30 
mph for up to 90 minutes (MCSC, 2008c).  
One Marine Corps SUAS Raven system consists of the basic components 
listed in Table 2, with an additional initial spares package (ISP) for operation and support 















The following are descriptions of the Raven SUAS components 
and their illustrations, shown in Figure 11 (PEO AVN, 2007a, pp. 4–5): 
 Ground Control Station and Remote Video Terminal: The 
GCS and RVT are essentially identical and provide the 
same functional capabilities for the SUAS. The components 
of each GCS/RVT are an RF unit with antenna, hub, cables, 
and a hand controller. 
 Air Vehicle: The air vehicle is designed with modular 
components (e.g., fuselage, center wing, left wing tip, right 
wing tip, tailboom, stabilator, battery, and payload) and can 
be snapped together without tools and ready for flight in 
under three minutes. The air vehicle consists of the 
airframe, avionics, navigation, and power 
components/subsystems required for flight. It is hand-
launched and has an autonomous landing capability.  The 
air vehicle accommodates modular electro-optical (EO) and 
IR payloads. 
 Payloads: The SUAS includes two separate payloads.  The 
EO payload provides imagery during daylight conditions, 
and the IR payload provides imagery during either daylight 
or night conditions.  These payloads provide video imagery 
downloaded to the GCS and RVT. These payloads are 
modular and can be snapped on or off without the use of 
tools. 
 Initial Spares Package: The ISP contains the battery 
chargers, batteries, kits, and spares required to sustain the 
system in the field. 
Description Qty 
Air Vehicle (excludes battery and payload) 3 
Electro-Optical (EO) payload (forward and side looking) 3 
Infrared (IR) payload (side looking) 2 
Infrared (IR) payload (forward looking) 1 
Ground Control Station (GCS) 2 
Remote Video Terminal (RVT) (spare) 1 
RSTA Kit 1 








 Field Repair Kit: The FRK is a small, lightweight kit that 
contains the components (e.g., propellers, stabilator clips, 
tape) and tools that the operators require to repair normal 
damage encountered during landings. 
 
Figure 11.   Basic RQ-11B Raven SUAS Illustration 
(PEO AVN, 2007a) 
AV advertises the Raven as the most advanced SUAS in the DoD’s 
inventory.  It is touted as rapidly-deployable and highly-mobile, providing U.S. forces 
with aerial observation (day or night by delivering real-time color or infrared imagery to 
the ground control and remote viewing stations).  AV lists describe the Raven as a small, 
lightweight, hand-launched ISR air vehicle with simple operation—that includes 
autonomous navigation, auto-land (deep stall) capability, and an interoperable system 








Table 3.   The RQ-11B Raven’s Technical Specifications 
(AV, 2010) 
Characteristic Capability/Measurement 
Range 10 km 
Endurance 60–90 minutes (rechargeable battery) 
 80–110 minutes (single use battery) 
Speed 32-81 km/h, 17-44 knots 
Operating Altitude 100-500 ft (30-152 m) AGL (typical) 
 14,000ft MSL (max launch altitude) 
Wing Span 4.5 ft (1.4 m) 
Length 3.0 ft (0.9 m) 





































IV. SUSTAINMENT OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS 
Marines employing the Raven during its early fielding in 2008 underlined the state of the 
supply and maintenance situation by summarizing the following observations in the 
previously cited 2009 MCCLL report: 
Confusion existed among some units regarding the supply and support 
system when repair and troubleshooting of the [Raven] system were 
required.  Logistical support of the system was not standardized with one 
battalion assigning it to their supply section while the other battalion 
assigned it to their communications section. (p. 2) 
The MCCLL report also listed other important lessons that 1st Battalion, 4th 
Marines (1/4) in Fallujah and 2d Battalion, 23d Marines (2/23) in Ramadi had learned 
through their combat experiences, emphasizing the importance of having an effective, 
standardized, and dependable sustainment structure.  Although they offered some 
recommendations for improved support, the Marines of 1/4 and 2/23 could only reflect 
the surface issues surrounding the apparent insufficient support of the Raven.   
Among the major issues the Marines cited were 
 no standard operational logistics chain among units, 
 lack of a universally defined level of repair, 
 no clear communication channels regarding support, 
 excessive lead time for requisitioned repair parts, and 
 not enough training on operation and troubleshooting. 
A. SUMMARY SUPPORT STRATEGY: ANALOG VS. DIGITAL DATA 
LINK 
As a brief overview of the evolution of sustainment for the Marine Corps’ Raven 
system, the MCSC and NAVAIR programmed the sustainment of the system utilizing a 
combination of the organic-CLS construct throughout its life cycle.  In the four years that 
the Marines have employed the Raven, the system’s support has been neither exclusively 








MCSC and NAVAIR to support the RQ-11 Raven throughout its life cycle have been 
hybrid solutions using varying degrees of the organic-CLS construct—in the beginning, 
the construct leaned more on organic support than CLS, but now the opposite is true. 
While initiating the contract for the Raven in 2007, the MCSC and NAVAIR did 
not plan or implement CLS to maintain the SUAS below the depot level of repair.  
According to the 2008 Marine Corps’ Fielding Plan, the MCSC and NAVAIR used the 
same FFP contract as the Army for production and post-production efforts in support of 
the analog Raven. The contract vehicles for standard post-production support included 
operator training, engineering support, and technical support.  However, after feedback 
from the MARFORs (the 1st Marine Division G-2 intelligence chief and the 2009 
MCCLL report), the NAVAIR analyzed the support plan for the Raven and researched 
strategies to improve the sustainment construct and performance.   
After coupling its qualitative analysis of user feedback with the quantitative 
analysis performed by the Army PM-UAS in 2010, the NAVAIR made the decision to 
initiate a modified CLS contract with AV under the Army’s prime contract.  The 
NAVAIR negotiated the CLS contract in consonance with the retrofit and fielding of the 
new DDL-upgraded Raven systems effective in mid-2011.  The source of the NAVAIR’s 
quantitative analysis came from the Army’s SUAS product manager, who consolidated 
Army-generated input through the 2007 core depot assessment (CDA) and the 2007 best 
value analysis (BVA) for the Pathfinder Raven, RQ-11B. 
B. SUSTAINMENT ANAYSIS UNDER DOTLMPF FRAMEWORK 
The Joint Capability Integration Development System (JCIDS) addresses the 
DoD’s capability shortfalls or gaps by using a capabilities-based approach to 
requirements generation and uses the DOTMLPF framework to analyze potential 
solutions to fill those gaps (JCIDS, 2012).  The JCIDS process provides a joint venue 
using common vocabulary for people working within its construct.  The acquisition 
proxies representing the Services and combatant commanders participate in the JCIDS 








make up DOTMLPF.  For this thesis, I used the DOTMLPF framework as a lens to 
analyze the evolving sustainment solution for the Raven.  The framework facilitates the 
analysis of capabilities by asking questions that help identify the key enablers of a 
capability. 
Where DOTMLPF definitions traditionally address operational capabilities and 
requirements, the following analysis more narrowly focuses on sustainment capabilities; 
however, some areas do overlap both aspects.  In the following sections, I provide an 
adapted definition of each area and outline what developers planned for fulfillment of the 
support requirement, discuss how or if the solution changed from the original design, and 
conclude with my assessment.  In this section, my analysis is primarily substantiated 
through official acquisitions documents and deduced from the recognized lessons learned 
through the experiences of Marines and experts who either use or support the Raven 
system. 
1. Doctrine   
Doctrine is the codification of fundamental principles that guide the 
employment of forces in coordinated action toward a common objective.  Doctrine 
includes universally approved documents outlining the way sustainment forces support 
the warfighter, including tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and operating 
procedures.   
a. Fielding and Support Plans 
The Army’s PM-UAS, the NAVAIR, the MCSC, and the MCLC 
collaborated with AV to develop the foundation for the supply and technical manuals, 
which provide comprehensive guidance and instruction on how to best execute the 
sustainment of the Raven.  Most of the information derived for this analysis comes from 
these documents and provides the greatest in-depth detail on the Raven’s support 








B systems, which both the 2008 and 2011 set of documents stated is a mix of CLS and 
organic support for the life of the system.  
In the initial fielding of the analog Raven systems in 2008, the Marine 
Corps concept of maintenance for Raven systems consisted of three levels: organizational 
(O), intermediate (I), and depot (D).  The MCSC planned on implementing organic 
support at both the O and I maintenance levels.  The Marine concept for Raven 
maintenance was different than the Army’s, which was field (organizational) and 
sustainment (depot) maintenance.  The Army excluded the concept of organic 
intermediate maintenance for its Raven systems.  Both Services agreed that the military 
operator would perform O-level tasks, while the prime contractor or organic depot (for 
the Army) performed D-level maintenance. 
AV designed the Raven as an easily-maintainable system, enabling typical 
user-level repair in less than 15 minutes.  The major components are modular line 
replaceable units (LRUs) and non-reparable LRUs (NLRUs) capable of being quickly 
removed and installed; furthermore, LRUs are composed of shop-replaceable units 
(SRUs) and non-reparable SRUs (NSRUs), and SRUs are composed of consumable parts.  
(1) Organizational-Level (O-level) Maintenance.  The 
organizational support strategy relies upon the Raven operator to perform the lowest level 
of maintenance using consumables or the supply of LRUs. O-level maintenance consists 
of inspecting, cleaning, and performing operational test procedures and preventive 
maintenance checks and services as well as limited corrective maintenance.  The operator 
has limited capability for repairs including corrective maintenance for basic airframe 
maintenance and limited removal and replacement of system LRUs.  Operators are 
responsible for fault isolation to a replaceable assembly or component and for removing 
and replacing the assembly or component to restore the system to full operational 
capability.  Operators have limited consumables and LRUs in the ISP and FRK and 
replenish their supplies through the standard supply system.  Hardware requiring 
maintenance beyond these tasks is evacuated to the intermediate supply activity for an 








(2) Intermediate-Level (I-level) Support and Maintenance.  
The difference between the Marine and the Army maintenance concepts was the 
establishment of I-level supply and maintenance tasks. I-level support consisted of a 
component direct exchange function performed by the intermediate supply activity and I-
level maintenance.  The I-level repairs basically included removing and replacing the 
failed SRU and the repair of the SRU through the removal and replacement of the failed 
part.  Other specific tasks included limited structural repair to the air vehicle, limited 
internal wiring repair, circuit card replacement, motor and controller replacement, and 
replacement of cameras in the nose cones.  The parts and units that were determined 
physically non-reparable (NLRUs and NSRUs) or not economically reparable were 
discarded according to supply instructions.  In the early establishment of the program, 
initial I-level repair was expected to be minimal until required repair parts were available 
in the initial issue provisioning (IIP). Therefore, interim I-level support involved utilizing 
the Army’s forward repair activity (FRA) for deployed Raven systems or the AV repair 
facility. Any LRU or SRU that required maintenance tasks beyond the skill of the I-level 
mechanics was shipped to the D-level maintenance activity.   
(3) Depot-Level Support and Maintenance.  The 2008 plans 
included an interim agreement with the Army’s PM-UAS to provide D-level support by 
the Army’s contracted FRA deployed systems and at the contractor’s repair facility for 
Raven training systems in the U.S.  However, this was an interim arrangement until the 
Marine Corps could establish a plan for long-term depot support of Marine Ravens.  The 
MCLC had the long-term responsibility of providing D-level supply support.  
Although the Raven’s logistics footprint is small and limited at the O-level 
to the extent of transportation of spares and consumables by the operator, the I-level and 
D-level activities maintained more substantial quantities of supplies.  A diagram of the 
basic flow of organic support and maintenance activities as planned in 2008 is illustrated 









Figure 12.   Diagram of Organic Analog Raven Supply and Maintenance Flow  
The 2011 support plan restructured the sustainment agreement between 
the Marine Corps, the Army, and AV in response to the previously mentioned reports of 
underperformance in support.  As the most immediate remediation, the NAVAIR entered 
into an arrangement with AV, who now performs more logistical support for the Marine 
Raven DDL systems under the current modified CLS contract.  The contract awarded in 
2011 mitigated the previous agreement with the Army PM-UAS and established 
dedicated capabilities through an FRA and CONUS repair facility for Marine Corps 
Ravens.  This specifically included elimination of the Marine organic capability 
providing I-level maintenance and D-level supply.  The contract facilitated a more 
exclusive relationship between the Marines and AV for field-level sustainment above the 
operator’s capability.  A diagram of the current modified flow of contractor supply and 
maintenance activities supporting reparable and consumable parts for both deployed and 
CONUS Raven DDL systems is illustrated in Figure 13.   
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Figure 13.   Diagram of Modified CLS Raven (DDL) Supply and Maintenance Flow  
b. Supply Instructions 
In 2007, the NAVAIR collaborated with the MCLC to create and provide 
instructions detailing supply processes and procedures for Marines operating and 
supporting the Raven.  The supply instruction (SI)-11015B-OD/1 outlined responsibilities 
for using units, supporting units, and the supporting establishment, including 
administrative requirements to facilitate the requisition and disposition of Raven supplies 
(USMC, 2007).  
c. Technical Publications 
Both the Army and AV developed the Raven’s O&M manual, addressing 
the operation of the system and the maintenance requirements for the unit level.  The 
manual is electronically loaded into the laptop computer issued with the fielded system 
and delivered to the users.  PMA-263 approves modifications and continued development 
of the system, which are reflected in changes to the manual and distributed to the MCLC, 
who in turn distributes them to all registered users. AV also developed a maintenance 
supplement for the USMC intermediate maintenance activity (IMA), which was also 
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with a copy of the supplement manual.  Changes to this supplement are updated through 
the USMC publications website; unit publications clerks bear the responsibility to update 
the unit’s publications list. 
d. Standard Operating Procedures 
The Marine Corps warfighting publication (MCWP) 3-42.1, entitled 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operations and published in 2003, is the most current doctrinal 
publication that the Marines maintain to address the fundamentals of planning and 
executing UAV operations.  It gives Marine commanders general guidance on command, 
control, and communication relationships that frame the UAV operating and support 
structures within the MAGTF.  It also provides operational and logistics support factors 
that the commander should consider when planning and executing UAV operations 
(USMC, 2003). 
e. Doctrinal Analysis 
In response to the 2009 MCCLL report and other observations that the 
organic supply and maintenance chain had shortfalls, there is no resounding evidence 
suggesting that there was a lack of doctrine or standard procedures in place as established 
by the supporting establishment (i.e., the NAVAIR, MCSC, MCLC).  A universally 
defined level of repair is clearly formed by the supportability plan for both maintenance 
and supply activities.  The technical and supply manuals also created clear 
communication channels to both organic and OEM representatives regarding support.  
However, the issue regarding the lack of a standard operational logistics chain among 
units is more closely related to the subsequent analysis of organizational factors since 
there was an obviously delineated supply chain above the unit level. 
Additionally, although there are detailed publications for operator 
sustainment of the Raven, MCWP 3-42.1 is an inadequate resource for commanders both 
in scope and detail because it only encompasses the fundamentals for operations 








guidance to commanders who have organic UAVs like the Raven and is limited in 
addressing factors outside the VMU operational relationship for intelligence gathering 
and logistics support.   
Similarly, the Army publishes its doctrine on UAS operations for 
commanders in the field manual (FM) 3-04.155, entitled Army Unmanned Aircraft 
System Operations.  The Army approved its most recent publication in 2009, which 
superseded the prior edition from 2006.  In it, the Army provides much of the same 
information as the MCWP 3-42.1 regarding command and control relationships as 
outlines guidance on support for planning and executing UAS operations.  It incorporates 
more detail than the Marine publication and contains extensive instructions on processes 
for sustaining and operating all UASs in the Army’s inventory, including the Raven B at 
the lowest echelon of its systems (U.S. Army, 2009).  
2. Organization 
In this section, I focus on analyzing how the Marine Corps organizes its 
sustainment forces to support the Raven.  I include a brief examination of both the units 
designated to receive and provide support.  The analysis specifically focuses on the GCE 
and LCE of the MAGTF because although the NAVAIR is the primary acquisitions agent 
for the Raven, the system is procured, operated, and sustained as a land-based or ground 
asset.    
a. Fielding Concept 
The fielding plan in both the 2006 and 2011 O&O stated that the Raven is 
fielded throughout the MAGTF with emphasis to the GCE maneuver companies.  The 
NAVAIR coordinated that the Raven systems be shipped to central holding and storage 
points identified by the major commands (e.g., MEFs, MARSOC). The plan then places 
responsibility upon the major commands to authorize release of the new systems to 
gaining units of their designation.  There are no further requirements or directives from 








the Raven systems, nor are there formalized documents at the MEF level outlining the 
distribution method.  
b. Operating Organizations 
The operator is at the lowest level of operating organization.  However, 
the organization in which the operator resides could vary even within the same battalion, 
as the concept of operations for using the Raven and intelligence gathering assets is left 
to the discretion of each commander.  The following statement is from the 2009 MCCLL 
report previously cited: 
The Raven B’s were primarily employed at the infantry company and 
platoon level with a majority of operators residing in the CLICs 
[company-level intelligence cells] and battalion S-2 sections. Raven B 
responsibilities were assigned as a collateral duty for the CLIC personnel. 
The CLIC was determined to be the most appropriate and logical place to 
manage the UAS and integrate it into the overall company intelligence 
collection plan. (MCCLL, 2009, p. 12) 
A CLIC is an ad hoc section of a Marine rifle company that serves as an 
organic intelligence cell, providing the company with battlefield situational awareness 
during “nearly constant noncontiguous operations—primarily patrolling” (Alles, 2006).  
The CLIC is not an official Marine Corps authorized organization, so it is typically 
composed of a handful of Marines assigned from existing company staff as a collateral 
duty.   
c. Supporting Organizations 
The operator is the primary O-level of support designated to maintain the 
Raven as outlined in the O&O.  However, similar to the fielding concept, there are no 
orders or directives designating support at the unit level immediately above the operator’s 
capabilities.  
The 2008 support plan required that operators evacuate hardware requiring 
maintenance beyond the O-level tasks to the repairable issue point (RIP) at the MLG for 








activity as the electronic maintenance company (ELMACO) in the MLG responsible for 
the I-level reparable maintenance tasks.  Interim support procedures for I-level support 
during 2008 were to utilize the D-level arrangement with the Army and AV.  Again, the 
2011 plan eliminated the organic I-level sustainment tasks. 
While the Marine Ravens received D-level repair from the Army’s FRA in 
Iraq for deployed Raven systems or at AV’s facility for Ravens in CONUS in 2008, the 
MCLC and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) provided D-level supply support.  
However, the new 2011 CLS contract shifted D-level support from the Army FRA to a 
Marine-specific FRA in Afghanistan and from the MCLC to a NAVAIR established 
supply support organization using government facilities and AV personnel in CONUS.    
d. Organizational Analysis 
None of the organizations designated above the O-level reported any 
problems supporting the Raven regarding management, functionality, or funds.  While 
the NAVAIR, MCSC, and MCLC issued very detailed and specific instructions on which 
organizations would provide support, a section of those instructions and manuals missed 
defining sustainment more clearly at the organizational level. However, in this case 
specifically, the responsibility was upon the MEF and its major subordinate commands to 
do so; they failed to provide a clear delineation on how to support the Raven systems 
above the operator level and below the I-level.   
Tying in the previous analysis regarding the dated and insufficient MCWP 
3-42.1, the guidance on the operation and support for commanders receiving the Raven 
was primarily left to the MEF, which was also given the responsibility to distribute the 
Raven systems to its major subordinate commands.  This led to non-standardized 
distribution of systems in which some commanders issued Raven systems for use among 
the different unit echelons.  The Marine Corps does not mandate the employment of 
CLICs with their self-established responsibilities regarding the SUAS; thus, the operation 
of Marine Ravens ranges from the platoon level to the regimental level without a 








The issue regarding the lack of a standard operational logistics chain 
among units rests mainly on the MEF and subordinate units and their lack of standardized 
guidance for supporting the Raven, which led to the confusion experienced by 1/4 and 
2/23 in 2008.  Commanders within the MEF and its subordinate units did not specify or 
properly enforce standard unit-level supply and maintenance activities and procedures to 
facilitate an effective sustainment strategy at the organizational level.  
3. Training 
Training encompasses how the Marines prepare to perform their tactical 
jobs using instructional methods to instill skill and develop proficiency, including basic 
training, advanced individual training, unit training, etc.  In this section, I examine the 
operator and maintenance training for the Raven system. 
a. New Equipment Training (NET) 
When fielding new equipment, the MCSC and NAVAIR establish, as 
standard practice, a mobile training team (MTT) to begin instruction almost immediately 
once the gaining unit receives the system.  In 2008, the Raven B MTTs were typically 
made up of activated Reserve Marines and augmented by contracted trainers from AV.  
The Marine Corps instructors attended the Army’s formal instructor training course at Ft. 
Benning, GA.  
The MCSC subsequently coordinated with Training and Education 
Command (TECOM) to develop a plan of instruction (POI) for the Marine Corps based 
upon the Army’s Raven B formal course curriculum; however, the CG of TECOM 
approved the use of a contracted MTT as the long-term training solution for the Raven B 
system in 2008.  Transition from the MCSC MTT to the NAVAIR MTT occurred in 
conjunction with a transfer of program responsibilities; however, the curriculum provides 
the same standardized training courseware throughout the Marine Corps.   
The Raven MTT instruction involves classroom and practical application 








limitations, and flight operations, to include all emergency procedures, navigation, 
airspace management, troubleshooting, and operator maintenance.  The length of training 
is approximately 10 eight-hour days for new operators and five days for certified 
operators.  The Raven B system has a built-in simulator designed for use by operators to 
maintain their skills, which also helps reduce the total operating cost for the SURSS 
program.  According to a logistics analyst at the NAVAIR, one 10-day training session 
costs approximately $50,000. 
b. Maintenance Training  
The Raven program office scheduled classes for the Marines designated to 
perform I-level maintenance in 2008 to support CONUS fielding.  AV conducted the 
classes at its facility in Simi Valley, CA, and covered advanced maintenance training; 
however, the 2008 fielding plan outlined that I-level maintenance training would shift to 
the responsibility of the MLG and should be included in their on-the-job-training (OJT) 
program in 2009.  This training requirement for I-level maintenance personnel was 
eliminated with the 2011 CLS contract. 
c. Training Analysis 
The NAVAIR and MCSC established a robust training system through 
formalized instruction in which competent Marines, soldiers, and contractors deliver 
quality operator training via MTTs.  The primary benefit of MTTs is that they travel to 
the user and provide the using unit flexibility in scheduling periods of instruction based 
around a high, and sometimes unpredictable, operational tempo.  They also save costs 
because they minimize the logistics associated with establishing a formal training 
environment with dedicated infrastructure such as manpower and facilities.   
However, establishing the MTT method of training as a long-term solution 
has disadvantages as well.  First, the using unit must schedule the training at a time that 
coincides with when the MTT is available.  Secondly, the responsibility is upon the using 








the unit’s Raven B systems, a classroom for nine to 12 operators, a range safety officer, 
access to a training range, range training support, and airspace clearance.  Without 
sufficient time and resources, these requirements could be a significant burden on a unit 
that does not have the flexibility or access to the necessary support.  Lastly, the lack of 
formal institutionalized training hinders the access to instruction for frequently rotating 
units and personnel.  The MCCLL emphasizes the importance of more substantial 
training opportunities:  
The level of introductory training by the MTT provided minimal 
opportunities for operators to work with the system. The training period 
conducted at MV [Mojave Viper Exercise] also did not provide sufficient 
opportunities for the Marines to practice employing the system, according 
to the commanding officer. (MCCLL, 2009, p. 13) 
The last disadvantage is part of the issue that likely contributed to the 
inexperience and insufficient knowledge that 1/4 and 2/23 Raven operators experienced 
in Iraq.  Nearly all Marine units experience frequent deployments and a high rate of 
personnel turnover.  The high personnel turnover issue directly impacts the unit’s 
requirement to screen qualified Marines prior to Raven operator training and extends into 
subsequent problems in maintaining and measuring operator proficiency, periodic 
recertification, and methods for conducting refresher training.  Units that experience 
these issues face severe challenges in effectively scheduling training by MTTs, especially 
during a period shortly following new equipment fielding.   
4. Materiel 
Materiel broadly encompasses all the equipment and parts necessary to 
sustain military forces so they can operate effectively.  In this section, I analyze processes 
and capacities associated with supporting the Marine Corps Raven systems.  
a. Fielded Systems 
The approved acquisition objective (AAO) established for the Marine 








Corps.  The three regular infantry divisions have more than 500 maneuver companies 
alone, and that number does not account for special operations units, expeditionary units, 
logistics units, air wing units, reserve forces, or the war reserve. Through the Raven 
fielding process, the MEF commander is responsible for establishing and managing 
fielding priorities within the MEF and controlling its established fielding schedule based 
on mission requirements and unit availability. The MEF commander must then decide 
how many systems a subordinate command receives, and likewise, the subordinate 
commander must decide which unit receives the Raven system.  Based on an AAO of 461 
systems, not every maneuver company will receive a Raven system. 
b. Repairables and Consumables 
In 2007, the MCSC and MCLC coordinated with AV to review and 
disassemble the Raven to determine which parts made-up the O-level spares and I-level 
parts.  AV provided all the necessary component information to the MCLC, who loaded 
the data into the Marine Corps’ automated supply and maintenance information 
management systems.  The MCLC also prepared logistics forecasts to estimate and 
purchase an initial allowance of parts based on AV’s engineering specifications (e.g., 
mean time between failures, mean time to repair) and the Army’s actual Raven usage 
data from previous years.  The MCLC placed parts needed to support the intermediate 
level of maintenance on contract with AV (MCSC, 2008c).  According to a logistics 
analyst at the MCLC, parts were sufficiently available in time for the planned CONUS 
fielding in 2008. 
The MCLC provided supply support for the Raven through contracts 
managed for secondary repairables (SECREPS) and the DLA for Class IX consumable 
materials during the initial fielding and sustainment of the system.  Additionally, the 
program office purchased and distributed the ISP with each system to every receiving 
major command for operator repairs as well as an IIP package.  The IIP contained 









The CLS contract in 2011 coordinated all subsequent supply support 
through AV, who, as the OEM, provides the most responsive and comprehensive support 
for parts.  The operator and using unit now use the FRA in Afghanistan and the AV 
CONUS facility to order repairable and consumable parts.   
c. Information Management Systems 
  The Marine Corps mandates the use of a computer-based information 
management system to support commanders and logisticians at all levels to facilitate 
supply and maintenance management and maintain visibility on the readiness statuses of 
its ground equipment.  Marines use the Marine Corps Integrated Maintenance 
Management System Automated Information System (MIMMS/AIS) to input and 
reconcile data for requisitioning all repair parts and maintenance-related supplies in 
support of organic sustainment operations.  Only Marines designated with supply- and 
maintenance-related specialties have access to the system; therefore, the typical Raven 
operator must rely on the support of external organizational or intermediate-level 
activities to replenish Class IX repairables and consumables.  
d. Materiel Analysis 
There is valid evidence that procedural shortfalls likely contributed to the 
excessive lead time for requisitioned repair parts during the initial fielding period.  
However, the excessive turnaround time associated with the supply chain is not 
necessarily due to a lack of material parts in the overall Marine Corps sustainment 
strategy.    
Since the quantity of Ravens is limited and not every maneuver company 
receives a system, the commanders within each MEF divided and distributed the Raven 
system along with its three air vehicles to best share the capability with its subordinate 
units.  The advantage to that practice is obvious on the surface; however, it has inherent 
disadvantages that likely caused some of the support issues that 1/4 and 2/23 reported in 








not as individual air vehicles.  Upon fielding, only one FRK and one ISP accompany the 
system.  However, because the system is divided among units that are sufficiently 
dispersed during combat, the spare parts are consumed rapidly or are otherwise difficult 
to attain before timely replenishment.  
Another issue related to supply chain responsiveness is the time-limiting 
factors linked to the verification process for requisitioned supplies at the Marine Corps’ 
D-level activities.  There is an inherent administrative burden at the MCLC and DLA 
commonly associated with fielding new systems.  Although the parts and supplies may be 
available, the rate of turnaround is slow, as the overall logistics management system 
transitions from one major end item to another.  However, the MCSC and NAVAIR 
planned for the slow build-up of supplies in the theater supply chain commonly 
associated with fielding new systems.   
The largest contributors to the apparent lack of supply support are most 
likely (a) inexperience or lack of proficiency associated with the Raven operators’ 
maintenance tasks combined with (b) the lack of knowledge regarding supply and 
maintenance activities.  Fundamentally, an effective supply chain relies on many things 
but chiefly upon its users’ proficiency and the users’ knowledge of how the system 
works.  The supply chain from the operator to the intermediate-level supply and 
maintenance activities was broken in 2008; it was not sufficiently defined for Raven 
operators and using units to implement the organizational-level tasks.  This was the 
responsibility of the commanders and using units within the MEF.  
An apparent symptom of the supply chain problem became evident when 
I, in the course of this research, was unable to extract usable or accurate historical data 
from the Marine Corps’ information management tool (MERIT) regarding the Raven.  
The MERIT is a web-enabled suite of software applications that graphically depict the 
current readiness posture and detailed supply and maintenance information for all Marine 
Corps readiness reportable equipment.  The MERIT is a conduit of information that 








throughout the entire Marine Corps.  Neither the MCLC nor PMA-263 logistics analysts 
could verify with any confidence the accuracy or amount of factual data in the official 
Marine Corps information system.  These observations are evidence that the supply and 
maintenance procedures clearly laid out in official instructions were not followed. 
5. Leadership and Education 
The leadership and education analysis in this section examines how the 
Marine Corps prepares and develops leaders and then how those leaders lead.  Leaders 
from the lowest to the highest levels in both Marine Corps and acquisition positions are 
the key to any program’s success.   
a. Military Operational Leadership 
The key military leaders include a variety of positions that range in level 
of responsibility and management for the Raven.  These military leaders are on the 
operating spectrum of the Marine Corps and have the most influence over the Raven’s 
day-to-day use and direct sustainment.  The leaders most closely related to the operation 
of the Raven include the company commanders and their key staff, whereas the MEF 
commanders are at the furthest distance from the actual system.   
b. Acquisition and Supporting Establishment Leadership 
Key acquisition professionals and leaders in the supporting establishment 
also include a variety of positions that range in degree of responsibility and management 
for the Raven.  These leaders have the most influence over the Raven’s initial and long-
term sustainment.  The acquisition professionals and supporting establishment roles most 
closely related to the sustainment of the Raven are the program officers and their key 
staff of engineers and logisticians, especially at the onset of the program and its initial 
stages of fielding.  Typically, after an initial transition period, a weapon system’s 








c. Leadership Analysis 
The commanders and logisticians throughout the operating forces as well 
as in the supporting establishment must have a thorough understanding and knowledge of 
the operations and sustainment processes for any pivotal intelligence system such as the 
Raven.  The effective employment of operational commanders’ warfighting capacities 
and the success of their operations depends upon not only the functional capability of the 
Raven system but also its operational availability.   
Part of this responsibility rests with the acquisition community and 
supporting establishment. They must provide the proper support mechanisms and 
education to the operating forces.  The remainder of the responsibility rests with the 
operational commanders themselves and their logisticians.  Without their ardent interest, 
authoritative influence, and directed guidance, a weapon system like the Raven could fail 
to fulfill its full potential due to deteriorated support, as is apparent from cited reports.  
The more that leaders understand the value of the Raven and the more involved they 
become in its sustainment, the more effective the system would become.  There should be 
incentive enough to provide the necessary energy for Raven support and direction to 
strengthen the sustainment process because a non–mission-capable Raven does not aid 
the commander’s battlefield awareness.  Instead, it only serves to hinder the unit’s 
capability in combat.  Nonetheless, the 2011 transition from organic supply and 
maintenance to the heavily weighted CLS sustainment construct was generally the result 
of leadership failure.  
6. Personnel 
In this personnel analysis, I examine the availability of qualified people to 
sustain forces during peacetime, wartime, and contingency operations.  I also explore the 
various requirements associated with sustaining the Marine Corps Raven by looking at 









Unlike the larger UASs in Groups 2 and 3, the CONOPS for the Raven 
involved no authorized changes to personnel requirements or tables of organization for 
using units.  The 2008 and 2011 fielding plans stated that any military occupational 
specialty (MOS) with minimal appropriate training could operate the Raven.  Aligned 
with the concepts established by early capability requirements documents, the Raven 
operator is a collateral duty assigned to personnel from within the using unit’s 
organization.   
Thus, conducting Raven operations was not intended as a primary duty or 
occupational specialty.  As such, the fielding documents advise commanders to anticipate 
the effect that Raven operations would have on their Marines’ primary duty. The simple, 
yet not formally definitive, screening of potential operators by unit commanders includes 
no extraordinary physical requirements besides a minimal working knowledge of 
computers, the ability to carry and launch the system, and the ability to read maps and 
conduct land navigation.  
b. Maintainer 
For the initial organic sustainment strategy, the 2008 fielding plan stated 
that Marines in ground electronics maintenance occupational field (OccFld) 28XX would 
perform the I-level maintenance.  The 28XX OccFld tasks incorporate various 
maintenance activities for common communications equipment used by Marine Corps 
ground forces, to include support for the Raven such as diagnosis, repair, adjustment, and 
modification of electronic equipment typically found on UASs. These Marines conducted 
I-level maintenance on the Raven system as a concurrent duty similar to what they had 
done for the Dragon Eye systems.  With the 2011 CLS contract, the requirement for these 
Marines to perform I-level maintenance dissolved with the elimination of the organic 








c. Personnel Analysis 
One of the primary advantages of not assigning a primary MOS or primary 
duty as a Raven operator is flexibility of employing the Raven at any level of the MEF 
without requiring specially trained Marines.  However, a disadvantage is tied to the 
discussion in Part 3 of this section regarding training in an operational environment with 
a high rate of personnel turnover.  Often the few certified Raven operators in a unit 
inevitably transfer at random times and leave the unit with a capability gap.   
Moreover, without the assignment of an MOS, the Marine Corps has no 
automated method of filtering Raven-qualified Marines in order to make manpower 
assignments based on capability needs.  Although commanders attempt to plan for this 
and schedule MTT instruction to mitigate those risks, many logistical and operational 
factors already mentioned may prevent the formal training from happening and then 
default to OJT.  This latter method of training creates significant shortfalls in operator 
skills, which undoubtedly led to some of the organizational sustainment problems 
previously discussed throughout this section.      
General John Joseph “Black Jack” Pershing, Commander of the American 
Expeditionary Forces during WWI, was famously quoted as saying, “The deadliest 
weapon in the world is a Marine and his rifle!” In other words, one of the most effective 
weapon systems of that time was an infantry Marine and his Springfield rifle.  An 
infantry Marine is indelibly linked to his assigned weapon, which has capabilities with 
which he is more than thoroughly familiar and proficient.  But he is also an expert on 
how to maintain the weapon in the field and knowledgeable of where to get support 
beyond his own capability.  The same holds true of a Marine motor vehicle operator and 
his tactical truck or a communications Marine and his field radio.  The infantry Marine 
knows how to get support from the armory, the vehicle operator from the motor pool, and 
the radio operator from the staff communications sections.  However, the same does not 
hold true of an infantry or intelligence Marine and the Raven to which he was only 









In the following analysis of facilities, I explore the potential that military 
property, government-owned installations, or industrial facilities that support military 
forces might serve as a method of filling a sustainment capability gap.   
U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 2464 requires that the DoD maintain a 
government-owned and -operated core logistics capability to ensure that its forces are 
rapidly and effectively sustained in case of emergency or contingency operations.  
Typically, military D-level repair and supply facilities satisfy this requirement; however, 
with an increased emphasis on procuring commercial equipment, the DoD has 
progressively relied on commercial contracts to fill its non-organic sustainment gaps.  
The Army’s 2007 CDA report “determined that the [Army’s] current organic industrial 
base does have the technical capability and capacity to provide depot-level maintenance 
support for all SUAS Pathfinder Raven hardware” (PEO AVN, 2007b, p. 2). 
Furthermore, the report includes recommendations to consider the Raven as a non-core 
system and for PM-UAS to conduct a BVA on three alternatives for long-term 
sustainment. 
The three alternatives under consideration in the 2007 BVA were (1) a 
100% organic supported depot, (2) a 100% contractor supported depot, and (3) a mixture 
of both organic and contractor supported depots (PEO AVN, 2007a).  The conclusion of 
the report highlighted the Army’s organic depot’s capability gap regarding the lack of 
requisite test and calibration equipment, technical data, and procedures, all of which were 
exclusively resident with AV.  The final recommendation was that the Army should 
maintain the contract relationship with AV for depot-level support based on two 
significant factors.  First, the cost to purchase the technical data from AV was prohibitive 
at over $40 million (not including the cost of test and calibration equipment).  Second, 
the risk associated with technological obsolescence and frequency of updates for systems 
was too high.   PMA-263 concurred with the findings in the BVA and furthermore used it 








C. COST ANALYSIS 
a. Affordability  
When PMA-263 procured the Raven B during its phase following 
Milestone C, the program had full funding to meet the Marine Corps’ AAO.  It avoided 
costs that the Army had absorbed for the transition of the Raven from its system 
development and demonstration phase. The acquisition plan stated, “based on the cost 
comparison of the Life Cycle Cost Estimates (LCCEs) for Block 0 and Block 1, the 
program will see a reduction in cost based on Then Year (TH) projections of $86.1M 
over the life (20 years) of the program” (MCSC, 2008c, p. 30).  The decision to transition 
from the Dragon Eye to the Raven saved the Marine Corps significant budget room.  
After the program was re-baselined to reflect the new LCCE, PMA-263 was able to 
properly resource the procurement of the approved quantity of both systems and support 
to equipment outlined in the 2006 O&O (MCSC, 2008c). 
b. Total Ownership Cost   
The total ownership cost (TOC) reduction of $86.1 million realized 
from the transition to the Marine Raven B was a result of survivability and reliability 
improvements that the Army PM-UAS had made based upon lessons learned from the 
Raven A.  Moreover, the Marine Corps benefited from the overall reduction of O&M 
costs based on the system’s improved reliability and increased survivability.  
Additionally, PMA-263 saved $8.4 million in R&D funding originally planned for 
capabilities improvements for the Dragon Eye.  Lastly, the Marine Corps benefited from 
the joint procurement of the Raven system, resulting in about $14,000 in savings per 
system over the Dragon Eye in addition to savings in spare parts (MCSC, 2008c). 
c. Cost Comparison of Modified CLS 
Using the costs for logistics support elements identified in the 
logistics requirement and funding summary (LRFS) found in the 2008 supportability 








sustainment plan with organic I-level support (MCSC, 2008a).  The calculated yearly cost 
of organic support inferred from the LRFS is approximately $9 million after adjusting the 
price to account for today’s value using a 7% inflation rate over four years.  Additionally, 
using the costs derived from the six-month modified CLS contract let in 2011, I adjusted 
those figures to reflect minor additional logistics elements that I estimated the Marine 
Corps would assume and calculated the cost over a one-year period.  The estimated cost 
of the modified CLS contract is approximately $16 million in today’s dollars.  The 
difference between the previous organic sustainment arrangement and the new contracted 
support is an expense of about $7 million per year, or about $140 million total lifetime 
cost in present value over 20 years. 
d. Comparison of Benefits and Limitations 
Using the primary alternatives of either organic support or CLS, Table 4 
and 5 illustrate the comparison of advantages and disadvantages. 
Table 4.   Advantages and Disadvantages of Organic Support 
(PEO AVN, 2007a) 
Organic Analysis 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Meets Title 10 requirement Need to establish organic capacity 





Increased personnel requirements 
Lower cost for support 
personnel 
Higher risk to Government 
(assuming full responsibility for 
configuration management) 
 Difficult to incentivize 
 Higher cost due to proprietary 








Table 5.   Advantages and Disadvantages of CLS 
(PEO AVN, 2007a) 
Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) Analysis 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Immediate source of skilled 
personnel 
Title 10 not immediately met 
Immediate availability of 
peculiar spares 
Delay in organic transition 
Lower risk to Government (AV 
maintains configuration 
management after IOC) 
Cost Plus contracts associated 





































V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study serves as a compilation of information and valuable lessons learned 
through a reflection of the Marine Corps’ historical relationship with unmanned aerial 
systems and a detailed analysis of its more recent acquisition and sustainment efforts that 
support the RQ-11B Raven.  The goal of the research was to explore and analyze the 
operational impacts of the Raven support plan directly affecting the warfighter in order to  
 document the Marine Corps Raven SUAS sustainment process and 
organization;  
 research and record lessons learned;  
 assess the performance for the sustainment of the past and current 
programs;  
 determine what benefits the Marine Corps realized through the current 
OEM-CLS contract; and 
 develop heuristics and/or criteria to help improve Marine Corps UAS 
acquisition and sustainment processes.   
A. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1.  Research Questions 
a.  Operational and Logistics Impacts 
What are the operational and logistical impacts of using a hybrid 
organic/CLS solution for supply and maintenance support of the RQ-11B Raven? 
(1)  Findings: I analyzed the full spectrum of both operational 
and logistical impacts of the organic/CLS solution through the lens of the DOTMLPF 
framework, in which operating units felt the most notable negative effects when the 
Raven was more heavily supported through the organic means.  Generally, this is not 
surprising considering that commercial industries such as AV are better equipped, 
funded, and skilled at supporting highly specialized pieces of equipment.   
(2) Conclusions: Although the Raven seems like a quick COTS 
solution akin to a radio-controlled model airplane, it is not.  It requires complex systems 
of processes and supporting elements to adapt the system to military needs.  The 








of the DOTMLPF to more complex supply and maintenance procedures that fall under 
any number and combination of the DOTMLPF framework.     
 (3) Recommendations: With the detailed analysis covered in 
Chapter 4, I provide the foundation of the following recommendations: 
 Doctrine:  The Marine Corps should update or 
develop a more comprehensive warfighting 
publication incorporating current operating 
procedures beyond the limited scope of the VMUs 
and UASs in Groups 2 and 3. 
 Organization:  The Marine Corps or MEF should 
provide delineating guidance to using units on a 
standard organizational construct for employing the 
Raven below the MEF level as well as clearly 
outline the level of repair that a system requires 
while using an organic sustainment concept.  I 
recommend that the unit S-6 communications 
section be the single source responsible for the 
maintenance and supply processes supporting the 
Raven because no other activity in a unit 
organization is as capable or apt to facilitate the 
Raven’s repair and supply flow. 
 Training:  The Marine Corps should establish a 
memorandum with the Army Infantry School at Ft. 
Benning to allow Marine operators to attend their 
formal basic instruction (such as with instructors at 
the master trainer course) in order to add flexibility 
of scheduling classes for individual Marines when 
needed.  Alternately, the Marine Corps should 
conduct a feasibility study on establishing a formal 
course through its own organic school 
establishments (e.g., Advance Infantry Training 
Battalion). 
 Materiel:  The Marine Corps should either approve 
a higher number of Raven systems for procurement 
and fielding or purchase additional components to 
outfit more FRKs, ISPs, and RVTs to accommodate 
how units are dividing the system into its three air 
vehicles. 
 Leadership: Leaders (e.g., commanders, 








instruction educating them on the Raven’s 
capabilities and limitations, including factors 
affecting sustainment  (e.g., Infantry Officer’s 
Course). 
 Personnel: At a minimum, Raven operators should 
be designated with a secondary MOS once certified 
on the system in order for units and the Marine 
Corps to better manage the turnover of personnel 
and mitigate risks for capability gaps.  I recommend 
that the using unit S-6 maintenance section be 
augmented with either an electronics maintenance 
technician or training to facilitate proper 
troubleshooting and repair at the organizational 
level. 
b. Costs of the CLS Contract 
Is the cost of the modified CLS contract supporting the RQ-11B 
Raven worth the supply and maintenance benefits? 
(1)  Conclusion: Mitigating support deficiencies to ensure that 
the Raven remains operational for Marines in combat is worth the cost of a CLS contract.  
However, I cannot determine if the additional $7 million per year, or $140 million over 
the lifetime of the Raven, is worth the advantages that the CLS provides to the Marine 
Corps.  Typically, when the military purchases a new system, the default sustainment 
strategy initially involves an interim CLS construct.  Although it is the more expensive, it 
provides the sufficient time to establish an organic capability, which could take a year or 
more.  Instead, the MCSC initiated the opposite support strategy, choosing to use organic 
support first.  After PMA-263 realized the lack of sufficient support to the warfighter, 
Marine leadership made the decision to revert to a similar CLS strategy that the Army 
used since it initially procured the Raven in 2003.  
While there are fewer advantages to using organic resources over 
CLS, the tendency for decision-makers today is to select the cheapest solution because it 
has the most immediate monetary cost savings.  This is likely a reflection of tightened 
budgets and restricted resources in more recent years and the drawdown of contingency 








support is much harder for the military to manage and is much less responsive to 
customer demand—especially when fielding new equipment.   
Furthermore, the establishment of an enduring supply and 
maintenance chain has become more difficult in the advent of more technologically 
advanced systems that frequently require updates and modifications.  The bottom line is 
that the cheapest support is almost never the best support; leaders need to understand how 
to balance the cost and performance of a system’s sustainment strategy and decide on the 
best value. 
(2) Recommendations. The Marine Corps should continue to 
use the CLS contract to support the Raven DDLs negotiated by PMA-263 until such a 
time that the program office determines that there is a better value alternative.  The 
recommendation for future acquisition and sustainment strategies should follow the 
traditional CLS construct to support newly-fielded systems.  After a period of time when 
the organic supply and maintenance activities determine that they are operationally 
capable to effectively support the Raven, then CLS should transition to organic support 
through close coordination among the various organizations.  However, leaders and 
logisticians at all levels need to pay strict attention to the performance of their sustaining 
activities and supply chain, adopt a genuine interest, and assume responsibility for the 
success or failure of their activities.  The organic sustainment strategy could have been 
successful at the O-level and I-level support activities if Marine Corps leadership at every 
echelon maintained and enforced the highest standards of performance from those 
organizations.   
B. FUTURE RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES 
There are numerous emerging opportunities to conduct research for the Marine 
Corps that would benefit the future acquisition efforts for unmanned systems.  The 
following recommendations are only a few that closely relate to this project:  
 What Group 1 UAS capabilities are most needed by future tactical units?  
 What is the most advantageous mix of unmanned aircraft types that offers 








 What are the sustainment organizations and processes for other Marine 
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